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FROZEN EMBRYOS: NEW 
TECHNOLOGY MEETS FAMILY 
LAW 
Natalie K. Young* 
INTRODUCTION 
A wide variety of reproductive technologies is now available 
for infertile couples seeking to raise biologically related off-
spring. These techniques include artificial insemination, 1 in vitro 
fertilization (IVF),2 and embryo transfer (ET).3 Many IVF pro-
grams have gone an additional step and now offer cryopreserva-
tion4 of embryos, a technological advance that further compli-
cates the already existing issues concerning basic IVF.II This 
'"Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; B.A., University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. 
1. Artificial insemination is the injection of semen, whether from the husband or a 
donor, by artificial means into a woman's uterus for the purpose of achieving pregnancy. 
Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. 
REV. 1641, 1643 (1984). 
2. In vitro fertilization "is the method of uniting egg and sperm outside the body 
and transferring the resulting embryo to a woman's uterus to achieve pregnancy." Note, 
Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1082-83 
(1986) [hereinafter Note, Frozen Embryos]. For further discussion of IVF, see Robert-
son, Embryos, Families & Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Repro-
duction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 947-51 (1986) [hereinafter New Reproduction]. 
3. A woman is artificially inseminated with the sperm of the husband of an infertile 
woman and the resulting embryo is flushed out and transferred to the uterus of the 
sperm source's wife. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 950-51. 
4. Cryopreservation is the procedure of freezing embryos in liquid nitrogen for stor-
age and later use. Note, Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1083. 
5. Two issues concerning IVF are "whether IVF and ET should be restricted to 
married couples, and whether reported success rates are based on so many different fac-
tors that they are rendered unreliable at best and deceptive at worst." Garcia, Reproduc-
tive Technology For Procreation, Experimentation, and Profit, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 4-5 
1990) [hereinafter Reproductive Technology]. Other issues focus on questions concerning 
"the rights and obligations among the [IVF] participants ... and the duty physicians 
practicing in the field owe to their patients." Id. at 7. See also Robertson, Ethical and 
Legal Issues in Cryopreservation of Human Embryos, 47 FERTILITY & STERILITY 371 
(1987). 
559 
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recent scientific development is raising unprecedented questions 
concerning the legal status of the frozen embryo.6 
Request for and use of reproductive technologies is ex-
panding' in part due to increasing infertility among persons with 
the means to finance these medical services.8 It is estimated that 
between two and three million Americans are unable to have 
children without medical assistance.9 Thus, many couples have 
turned to noncoital reproductive techniques to create a family.lo 
Unlike artificial insemination, IVF permits infertile women with 
damaged fallopian tubes to actually bear their own child.ll How-
6. Controversial issues concerning the use of embryos include "whether embryos 
are humans that should be accorded the respect and rights of a human, and whether the 
neglectful treatment or willful destruction of embryos should be declared morally repre-
hensible and against the law." Reproductive Technology, supra note 5, at 7. Issues also 
arise regarding the handling of excess embryos. Such issues concern "the possible harm 
to embryos as a result of thermal manipulation and the legal, moral, and ethical status of 
frozen embryos." Id. 
7. Today, thousands are born from artificial insemination and IVF techniques each 
year in the United States alone. Note, Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1081. In recent 
years, the demand for infertility services has risen. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, INFERTILITY; MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 50, 55 (1988) [hereinafter OTA, Infer-
tility). See also J. YEH & M. YEH. LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 2-3 (1991) [hereinafter 
INFERTILITY) (increase in number of physician visits for infertility services). 
8. Peters, Protecting The Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability, and Repro-
ductive Technology, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 487, 490 (1989) [hereinafter Protecting The 
U nconceived). 
"Infertility is now appearing with greater frequency among large numbers of white, 
educated middle and upper income women in their twenties and thirties." New Repro-
duction, supra note 2, at 945. "The rising rate of infertility can be explained by changes 
in sexual behavior, work roles, and postponement of marriage and childbearing." Id. 
"Unlike the poor, [middle class women) usually have the health insurance or private 
means to cover the costs of infertility treatment."ld. at 946. "Widespread publicity about 
the latest fertility treatment, the absence of easily adoptable children, and a growing 
number of physicians entering this field, also contribute to the interest in IVF." Id. See 
also INFERTILITY. supra note 7, at 3 (other factors contributing to the increase in demand 
for infertility services). 
"From 1965 to 1982, infertility in married women aged 20 to 24 rose from 3.6% to 
10.6%." Note, Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1079 n.2. "Roughly one-sixth of all 
people of childbearing age in the United States suffer from infertility." Developments -
Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1526 (1990) [hereinafter Med-
ical Technology and the Law). Government statistics, available only for married couples, 
indicate that primary fertility (the inability to have a child) doubled between 1964 and 
1982. OTA, Infertility, supra note 7, at 50. The number of couples suffering from sec-
ondary infertility (couples who are parents at least once but are unable to have another 
child), however, has decreased, making the overall rate of infertility fairly constant. Id. 
9. Protecting The Unconceived, supra note 8, at 490. 
10. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
11. Most infertility treatments result in fertilization of the egg within the woman's 
body. With IVF, however, fertilization of the egg occurs outside the body, after which the 
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ever, the odds of successfully achieving pregnancy by this 
method are no more than ten to twelve percent. 12 Still, IVF may 
be the only way for some couples to have a child. The embryo 
freezing technique further facilitates the opportunity for couples 
to become parents through IVFY 
fertilized egg is placed in the uterus. IVF allows fertilized eggs to reach the uterus of a 
woman with blocked fallopian tubes. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 944. 
IVF involves the aspiration of several eggs from the follicles "through a surgical 
procedure known as laparoscopy. To enhance the process, practitioners of IVF generally 
administer hormones to the woman, resulting in the release of more than the usual, sin-
gle egg during ovulation." Following insemination of the egg by the sperm and the subse-
quent cleavage, the fertilized egg is transferred to the uterus. Note, Frozen Embryos, 
supra note 2, at 1082-83. See New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 948, for further infor-
mation on the administration of hormones and cleavage of the fertilized egg. 
"Implanting more than one fertilized egg increases the probability of successful 
pregnancy." Note, Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1083. "One clinic which boasts of 
one of the highest birth rates using artificial insemination reports a 20% chance of preg-
nancy if one embryo is implanted, a 28% chance if two are implanted, and a 38% chance 
if three are used." Id. at 1083 n.25. 
12. Medical Technology and the Law', supra note 8, at 1539 & n.93. The likelihood 
that a transferred embryo will implant is estimated to be one in ten, which results in a 
lesser chance that it will come to term, since 25% to 35% of implanted embryos often 
spontaneously abort. See Grobstein, Flower & Mendelhoff, External Human Fertiliza-
tion: An Evaluation of Policy, 222 SCI. 128-29 (1983). In May 1984, it was reported that 
1209 out of 9641 IVF treatment cycles resulted in pregnancies, giving a 13% viable preg-
nancy rate. Another way to determine the pregnancy rate is per number of embryos 
transferred, which ranges from 10% viable pregnancies per single embryo transfer, to 
19% per three embryos transferred. However, most programs do not achieve this rate. 
Soules, The In Vitro Fertilization Pregnancy Rate: Let's Be Honest With One Another, 
43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 511-12 (1985). 
13. The remaining embryos could be stored for future implantation. Freezing would 
enable the couple to avoid ovarian stimulation and laparoscopy on subsequent cycles if 
later attempts at IVF were undertaken. Only the implantation phase of IVF would be 
necessary. Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2098 (Blount County Cir. 
Ct., Tenn., Sept. 26, 1989). 
Furthermore, "where several eggs are obtained and fertilized, it may be dangerous or 
undesirable to implant them all at once . . .. No more than three embryos should be 
implanted at one time to avoid the risks involved in multiple pregnancies." Note, Frozen 
Embryos, supra note 2, at 1083. "The risks of multiple gestation are to the mother and 
to the offspring. The mother may have to have a cesarean section, and may experience 
more complications during pregnancy. Multiple gestation leads to prematurity and a 
high neonatal mortality rate." New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 977 n.127. 
Since the ovarian stimulation drugs and anesthesia administered during IVF treat-
ment could cause the uterus to be less likely to accept a transferred embryo, another 
benefit of embryo transfer after storage is that it may improve the chances of achieving 
pregnancy because the body would have time to free itself of the drugs prior to embryo 
transfer. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 949. 
Moreover, at some point in time, embryo freezing becomes a necessity for some 
women such as "those who do not produce a child from their first attempt at implanta-
tion or those who wish to have more children in the future." Note, Frozen Embryos, 
supra note 2, at 1084 (anticipation of future damage to the ovaries or eggs, anticipation 
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Statistics show the increased use of IVF and embryo freez-
ing procedures. 14 Given this fact, the likelihood of legal contro-
versy arising from utilization of these techniques is quite high. 1& 
In turn, the need for legislation at the state level regarding cry-
opreserved human embryos will become more urgent. 18 The fun-
damental decision for state legislatures will be whether frozen 
embryos should be treated as life or as property. 
This article addresses the various reasons and legal argu-
ments for treating embryos as life, or in the alternative as prop-
erty. In particular, this article analyzes the legal status of frozen 
embryos in a marital dissolution proceeding from a custodial 
point of view and a marital property point of view. 17 Part I sets 
forth a broad policy perspective on the doctrinal choices that 
must be made in determining the legal status of the embryo. 
Part II first explores the possibility of classifying frozen embryos 
as human life and then presents a legal analysis, derived from 
of radiation or other therapy which might damage the ovaries, or damage to ovaries, 
rendering subsequent laparoscopy difficult or impossible). 
14. In 1988, 22,649 IVF cycles and 1,025 frozen embryo transfer cycles were per-
formed. Medical Research International and the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, The American Fertility Society, In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer in 
The United States: 1988 Results from the IVF-ET Registry, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
13, 14, 18 (1990). In 1987, 14,647 IVF cycles and 490 frozen embryo transfer cycles were 
performed. Medical Research International and the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, The American Fertility Society, In Vitro Fertilization/Embryo Transfer in 
The United States: 1987 Results from the National IVF-ET Registry, 51 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 13, 15, 17 (1989). In 1985 and 1986, there were 2389 and 2864 IVF cycles, 
respectively, and 26 and 112 frozen embryo transfer cycles, respectively. Medical Re-
search International, The American Fertility Society Special Interest Group, In Vitro 
Fertilization/Embryo Transfer in The United States: 1985 and 1986 Results from the 
National IVF/ET Registry, 49 FERTILITY & STERILITY 212-13 (1988). In recent years, the 
demand for infertility services has risen. OTA, Fertility, supra note 7, at 55. 
15. A few state courts have already encountered cases concerning frozen embryos. 
See Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2097 (Blount County Cir. Ct., 
Tenn., Sept. 26, 1989) (a divorcing couple fought over what should happen to their seven 
frozen embryos); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) ( a couple wanted to 
transport a frozen embryo from Norwalk, Virginia, to Los Angeles, California, against the 
wishes of the IVF program). Also, the controversy surrounding frozen embryos escalated 
upon the death of a wealthy Los Angeles couple and the discovery of two "orphaned" 
embryos which the couple had frozen and stored in Australia. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1984, 
§ 2, at 10, col. 5. 
16. Because our legal system traditionally commits to the states the development of 
property laws and domestic relations laws, this analysis also follows state law. This arti-
cle will use California as an example for that type of legislation. 
17. Family dissolution proceedings involve the granting of child custody and the 
awarding of marital property. Therefore, the frozen embryo of a divorcing couple will 
either be the subject of a custody award or of a property distribution. 
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the general principles of family law, for treating frozen embryos 
as minor children in a marital dissolution proceeding. Part III 
explores the possibility of classifying frozen embryos as property 
and then more specifically as marital property in a marital disso-
lution proceeding. Part IV concludes that state legislation is 
needed stating that embryos should be treated as property and 
not as human life. 
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Given that there is currently no legislation or case law stat-
ing whether the embryo can be regarded as human life or as 
property, policy considerations become instrumental in the pro-
cess of determining the legal status of the embryo. Since the em-
b:r;yo is created in the earliest stages of human development, pol-
icy considerations concerning such areas of human reproduction 
as abortion, contraception, and fetal protection are particularly 
relevant. 
The main policy choice is influenced by the tendency in our 
country to sometimes treat human beings as property. This ten-
dency is historically illustrated by the ownership of blacks as 
slaves18 and by the treatment of wives as the property of their 
husbands. From this treatment of human beings as property 
seems to flow a sacrifice of one's civil liberties,19 i.e., the placing 
of the property of some above the humanity of others. This no-
tion indicates that a choice must sometimes be made as to what 
will be treated as property and what will be treated as life. 
The presence of such a choice is particularly apparent upon 
18. Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and 
Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81 (1990) [hereinafter Exploration of Property Ar-
chetypes]. Furthermore, in UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. 
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990), all women of childbearing age, regardless of their intent 
to have children, were barred from working in a battery manufacturing plant for fear of 
exposing their fetuses to lead poisoning. Thus, the female employees were disfranchised 
and disowned "to the ideal, nonexistent, unborn, uncarried, unconceived, and un-
thought-of child." Id. at 86-89. 
19. Id. at 82, 93. "Brazilian employers, fearing that they will have to pay benefits 
under Brazil's new maternity laws, ask their female employees to provide proof of sterili-
zation." Id. at 89. "The Brazilian situation builds economic incentives for poor 
women . .. to just say no to ever having children - incentives to give up a part of 
themselves in order to reap a pecuniary benefit." Id. 
5
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the examination of fetal protection cases.20 In these cases, the 
fetus seems to be given greater attention than the woman and 
her body.21 If women assert their own interests through their fe-
tuses, then the fetuses are considered separate persons. How-
ever, the result of contending that fetuses are persons, and 
hence that fetuses are life, would be that women would then 
submit themselves to treatment as property.22 This idea impli-
cates a choice as to whether the embryo or the woman should be 
treated as property. 
If the woman were to be treated as property and the fetus 
as life, then the woman's interests would be sacrificed for those 
of the potential life. However, by treating the fetus as property 
and the woman as life, the interests of the actual living person, 
i.e., the woman, would be promoted. The more logical choice 
would be to promote the interests of the already existing person 
and thus, treat the embryos as property by treating the woman, 
as she should be, as life. It follows that the embryo should be 
treated as property that can be regulated to further the interests 
of the woman, rather than treating the body of the woman as 
property that can be regulated to further the interests of the 
embryo. If a choice must be made between treating the potential 
life as life or treating the woman as life, the latter should be 
given the status of life, since she is an actual, legally, socially, 
and biologically recognized human being. 
Three major positions have evolved as a result of the debate 
over the moral status of the embryo. The first position holds 
that the embryo is a person that exists from the point of concep-
20. See Missouri Fetus Unlawfully Jailed, Suit Says, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1989, at 
B5, col. 3 (a pregnant inmate was suing the state on behalf of her unborn fetus, asserting 
the lack of due process accorded the fetus in placing it in jail); Churchwille, D.C. Judge 
Jails Woman as Protection for Fetus, Wash. Post, July 23, 1988, at AI, col. 5 (a preg-
nant woman was imprisoned to protect the fetus from the woman). 
21. "Her needs are suppressed in favor of a conceptual entity that is 'innocent: 
ideal, and all potential." Exploration of Property Archetypes, supra note 18, at 92-93. 
[d. 
22. In bargaining this way, however, pregnant women trade in in-
terests larger than the world of prisoner's rights. In having the 
fetus declared an other person, in allowing separation in order 
to benefit the real mutuality, they enslave themselves to the 
state. They become partialized in the commodification of that 
bargain .... 
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tion or fertilization and is entitled to the rights of a person.23 
The second position views the embryo as a living human entity 
that should be accorded "special respect,"24 although not the 
same respect accorded to persons.211 Finally, the third position 
argues that the embryo is neither a person nor even a rights-
bearing entity.26 This article will discuss these positions and 
their relevant policy consideratons and ultimately arrive at a 
conclusion that is consistent with the policy choice in favor of 
treating embryos as property and women as life. 
The first position, which holds that the embryo is a person, 
is a view held by right to life groups27 and various religions, in-
cluding the Catholic Church.28 Under this position, the embryo 
must be provided the opportunity for implantation,29 and the 
embryo must not be destroyed or harmed.30 Relevant to the dis-
cussion that embryos are persons is the impact of religion and 
science on this position. 
The first point to be examined is the possible role that reli-
23. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 437, 444 (1990) [hereinafter Early Embryos). See also New Reproduction, supra 
note 2, at 971 (the embryo-as-person position "views the embryo as a human subject 
after fertilization and requires that it be accorded the rights of persons"). See also Note, 
Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1089-90 (some view the embryo as a person that 
should be accorded all of the claims and rights of a person). 
24. "The term 'special respect' is taken from several influential advisory bodies that 
have examined new reproductive technologies." Early Embryos, supra note 23, at 446 
n.31. 
25. Id. at 446. See also New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 972-75 ("the preim-
plantation embryo deserves respect greater than that accorded human tissue, but not the 
respect accorded persons"). See also Note, Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1089-91 
("the embryo is a living human entity deserving respect, though not meriting the same 
protections as people"). 
26. Early Embryos, supra note 23, at 445. See also New Reproduction, supra note 
2, at 972-74 ("the embryo has no status different from that of any other extracorporeal 
human tissue"). 
The prevailing legal view, articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Roe v. Wade, is that fetuses are not persons within the mean-
ing of the fourteenth amendment, and thus, are not entitled to 
either its due process or equal protection guarantees. If a fetus 
is not a person, then a fortiori an embryo certainly is not. 
Note, Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1089. 
27. Note, Frozen Embryos, supra note 2, at 1090. 
28. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 971 n.103. 
29. Id. at 971. 
30. Early Embryos, supra note 23, at 444. See also New Reproduction, supra note 
2, at 971 (freezing and most kinds of embryo research may harm the embryo). 
7
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gious doctrines may play in the determination of whether em-
bryos are persons. Reliance on an "ensoulment" claim31 would 
lead to the conclusion that life begins at conception and, there-
fore, that embryos are persons. However, the point at which 
human life legally begins is not solely a matter of religion,32 and 
the Establishment Clause3s does not prevent legislation which 
answers the question of whether embryos are persons. Only l. 
legitimate secular purpose for the legislation is necessary to en-
act a law that is in conflict with someone's religious beliefs.s• 
Since the proposition that embryos are life should not be based 
on religion, the policy choice in favor of treating embryos as 
property and women as life still holds. 
The next point to be examined is the role of science in the 
determination of whether embryos are persons. Personhood is 
not a matter of fact. 311 It is a legal and moral status that is given 
at a certain point in human biological development depending 
on the normative context.S6 Since the point at which an embryo 
31. An "ensoulment" claim is the claim that God infuses a human soul into every 
fertilized egg. Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at 
Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 625 (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter When Life Begins). 
32. If this determination were solely a religious one, then no prohibition of abortion 
could be sustained, since the Establishment Clause would preclude states from enacting 
any particular answer into law. [d. at 614. 
33. The Establishment Clause is the provision of the first amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " . 
34. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 1204-05 (2d ed. 1988). A legitimate secular purpose could be regu-
lation of abortion or regulation of IVF and embryo transfer procedures. 
35. When Life Begins, supra note 31, at 601. The facts regarding human biological 
development by themselves are not dispositive; it is a question of attaching significance 
to these facts. [d. at 619. 
36. When Life Begins, supra note 31, at 601, 617, 627. Personhood is no different in 
its conceptual structure from another status conferred later in life: adulthood. [d. at 601. 
[d. at 619. 
Because personhood is a matter neither of religion nor of fact, 
we must conceptualize personhood in exactly the same fashion 
as we conceptualize adulthood: as a conclusory term designat-
ing a point at which we choose to attach to a developing 
human a certain legal or moral status. This status will depend 
not on an inherently dispositive developmental event, but on a 
combination of the developmental facts and the consequences 
that follow from the status. Thus, our determinations of 
"adulthood" may well differ in different contexts. 
Regarding the legal status of personhood, there need be no absolute answer. [d. at 
601. "Different answers may be appropriate in different contexts - abortion, inheritance, 
assault, and so forth - depending on the particular legal or moral considerations at is-
8
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becomes a person is not a question of fact, the law need not 
adopt a medical determination of when life begins.37 However, 
for an embryo to be a person, life would have to begin at least at 
the point of conception. This is not a plausible proposition. 
First, an embryo is not created during the earliest steps in 
embryonic development, that is, at the point of conception or 
fertilization. 3S Second, the embryo is not yet individual since 
twinning or mosaicism could still occur.39 Third, the embryo 
lacks the rudimentary structures of a nervous system.40 Al-
though genetic completion occurs at fertilization, holding all the 
necessary genetic information about an individual human being 
is not the same as being a human being.41 Personhood cannot be 
based on the fact that a line cannot be drawn in our ontogeny 
distinguishing between an embryo and a human being.42 Because 
the embryo is not an individual, because it lacks a differentiated 
nervous system, and because it is not sentient, an embryo cannot 
be treated as a person.43 Thus, conception is not a point in 
human . biological development at which the status of per-
sue." [d. 
37. "Because of the normative nature of the judgment of personhood, neither medi-
cal nor scientific expertise can ever be dispositive." [d. at 619. 
38. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 969. "The zygote, morula, and early blasto-
cyst stages may be regarded as pre-embryonic stages (sometimes referred to as the con-
ceptus or pre-embryo), with the term 'embryo' reserved by some persons for the rudi-
ments of the whole individual that appear at the end of the second week after 
fertilization." [d. at 969-70. 
39. [d. at 970. Twinning produces two individuals; mosaicism produces less than 
one. [d. "Developmental individuality in the sense of singleness is not established until 
an embryonic axis is formed, an event which roughly corresponds to the time of implan-
tation and to the initiation of physiological changes of pregnancy in the mother." [d. 
[d. 
40. [d. 
The embryonic disc, axis, and primitive streak, which begin to 
emerge at or after implantation, are the precursors of embry-
onic and fetal nervous structures. Until they emerge there is 
no possibility of feeling or experience of any sort. It is consid-
erably later in gestation - roughly six to eight weeks - that a 
spinal column and nervous system develop. 
41. When Life Begins, supra note 31, at 625. 
42. [d. "Because the development of this genetically complete zygote is a gradual, 
incremental process, 'there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child.' " [d. 
"But that does not make it correct - nor even plausible - to conclude that the thing at 
one end of the spectrum is the thing at the other. No nonarbitrary line separates the 
hues of green and red. Shall we conclude that green is red?" [d. 
43. Personhood cannot begin at conception because there are some developmental 
factors that do not exist in a blastocyst. [d. at 627. 
9
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sonhood can be conferred. Once again, this result is consistent 
with the policy choice in favor of treating embryos as property 
and women as life. 
The second position holds that greater respect is due em-
bryos because of their potential to become persons and because 
they are a symbol of human life.44 Since the embryo is geneti-
cally unique and has the potential to develop into a person, it 
serves as "a powerful symbol or reminder of the unique gift of 
human existence."41S Also, since it touches the consciousness of 
society more effectively than other human tissue, it deserves 
special treatment even if it is not itself a rights-bearing entity.46 
This view is reflected in official and professional reports, in the 
legal arena, and in ethical and philosophical discussions.47 
Although the potential life has no interests as an indepen-
dent person that the state can claim to be protecting, the poten-
tiallife may at least have potential interests.48 But, the potential 
cannot be said to possess the very qualities that differentiate it 
from the actual. 49 The distinguishing feature of personhood is 
that human beings have interests unto themselves that mandate 
moral respect, and a human being's life should receive more re-
44. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 972. See also Early Embryos, supra note 
23, at 446 (the embryo may be accorded special respect because it is genetically unique, 
living human tissue that has the potential to develop into a fetus and newborn). 
45. Early Embryos, supra note 23, at 447. "Such symbolizing is an essential part of 
any human community, and helps constitute and identify the community's values." New 
Reproduction, supra note 2, at 975 & n.119. 
46. Early Embryos, supra note 23, at 447. 
Id. at 448. 
While other objects or entities may also serve this function, 
the embryo serves it especially well because of its role in the 
series of events that lead to the birth of a child. Yet because of 
its rudimentary development and its slim chances of im-
planting and coming to term, it is a less powerful symbol of 
human community than are more developed fetuses or re-
cently dead cadavers. 
"We may choose to treat the embryo differently than other human tissue as a sign of 
respect for human life generally." New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 974. 
47. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 972 & nn.l05-08. See also Early Embryo, 
supra note 23, at 446 n.31. 
48. When Life Begins, supra note 31, at 611. 
49. Id. at 612. "Ice, potentially a liquid, does not conform to the shape of a 
container to which it is transferred; if it did, we would be obliged to admit it was already 
a liquid." Id. 
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spect than any other worldly thing. ~o To attribute these features 
to a "potential" person is to transform the potential into the 
actual. III 
Conception, like viability, brings the potential life an impor-
tant step closer to actualization, but the potentiality of human 
life may exist before as well as after these two events.~2 A poten-
tial life cannot possess an actual interest in anything - and cer-
tainly not in its own life - unless it is deemed to be an actual 
rather than a potential life. ~3 Furthermore, if the state were to 
have a compelling interest in protecting potential life from the 
point of conception, controversial results would follow. 64 Hence, 
this position is also consistent with the policy choice in favor of 
treating embryos as property and women as life. 
The third position holds that the embryo is not a person or 
even a rights-bearing entity.~~ Because the embryo is not yet an 
individual, because it lacks a differentiated nervous system, and 
because it is not sentient, an embryo cannot be treated as a per-
son. ~6 The potential to become a person does not mean that an 
actual person already exists or that the potential person should 
be treated as an actual person and be entitled to the same rights 
50.Id. 
51. Id. "Consider the extraordinary consequences of ascribing to potential human 
life an actual interest in being born. The potential children of a proposed marriage are 
potential persons too. The unfertilized ovum that may be fertilized on any given night 
also represents a potential human life." Id. 
52. Id. "An unfertilized ovum also has the potential to develop into a whole human 
being, but that does not make it a person." Id. at 625. The argument that potential 
development plus genetic completion equals personhood also fails because nucleic trans-
plantation technology gives non-zygotic cells the potential for such development. Id. 
Id. 
53. Id. at 612-13. 
54. Id. at 613. 
A state could forbid not only abortion, but contraception as 
well. More than this, a state could compel individuals to 
marry or procreate with specified individuals and at specific 
times, all in the name of protecting potential lives. If potential 
life has an interest in being born, and if the state can invoke 
that interest to supersede the right of privacy, these possibili-
ties, which mayor may not be farfetched, would be well within 
the arguable scope of constitutional legislation. 
55. This view seems to "maintain that as long as those with decision making author-
ity over the embryo consent, no limits should be imposed on actions regarding embryos." 
New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 972. This notion is exemplified by the willingness of 
some to allow discard and research on embryos. Id. at 972 n.l04. 
56. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
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as an actual person.1I7 This view is consistent with the policy 
choice of treating embryos as property, rather than human life, 
so that the actual living person can be treated as life. 
Even though three possibilities exist, the legal analysis will 
not focus on the second position because the legal analysis is 
situated in prevailing law. Under prevailing law, there is a choice 
of either property or life. There is no intermediate category. 
Hence, the legal analysis will address only the positions of the 
embryo as life and the embryo as property. 
II. CUSTODY ANALYSIS 
A. WHETHER EMBRYOS CAN BE CONSIDERED HUMAN LIFE UNDER 
PREVAILING LAW 
Historically, the fetus has not been treated as a legal entity 
in its own right and has not been protected by laws against 
homicide or wrongful death. liS For instance, many infanticide 
and homicide statutes prohibit actions for the death of a fetus, 
although some infanticide and homicide statutes permit actions 
if the fetus was viable when injured.1I9 At common law, the fetus 
57. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
58. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
Legal personhood requires that the fetus be born alive - separated from the mother 
and existing independently, albeit with support. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 
973. The extracorporeal embryo is not likely· to be included in this definition of person 
because of its rudimentary biological status, and because it must be transferred to a 
uterus for development, and eventually birth, to occur. [d. 
Indeed, the biology of early embryo development strongly supports the view that the 
preimplantation embryo is not a person or a rights-bearing entity in its own right. [d. at 
974. Specifically, the embryo biologically is not yet an individual, it lacks a differentiated 
nervous system, and it is not sentient before implantation. [d. at 968-70. Prior to implan-
tation and for some time thereafter, pre implantation embryos do not qualify for protec-
tion given the absence of any current legislation or case law entitling the embryos to 
rights traditionally associated with human beings. [d. at 974. 
59. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976) (the 
homicide statute applies only to a viable fetus, namely, one capable of living outside the 
uterus); Bayer v. Suttie, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972) (the legislature 
did not intend to include an unborn child within the meaning of "person" in the wrong-
ful death statute); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 
481 (1970) (the only viable fetus that is a "human being" within the meaning of the 
homicide statutes is one in the process of being born); People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 
621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947) (for the purposes of the manslaughter and murder statutes, 
human life may exist where childbirth has commenced but has not been fully 
completed). 
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had limited rights in torts and property.60 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of the posi-
tion that life begins at conception.61 
As in so many aspects of reproductive rights, the principles 
set forth in the twin cases of Roe v. Wade62 and Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services6s govern the basic analysis here. Roe 
held that the state's interest in potential life begins at viabil-
ity.64 Thus, under Roe, the state's interest in potential life could 
not encompass the existence of the embryo. Under Webster, 
however, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting potential life even before via-
bility.6!! Therefore, if a state were to hold that its interest in the 
60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E. 2d 1324 (1984) (al-
lowing tort recovery by a fetus, but only after the point of viability); Wallace v. Wallace, 
120 N.H. 675, 421 A.2d 134 (1980) (finding that an action for an automotive death could 
not be brought on behalf of an aborted nonviable fetus). 
61. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (declin-
ing to rule on the constitutionality of a Missouri statute stating that life begins at 
conception). 
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
63. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. In Roe, a pregnant single woman challenged the constitu-
tionality of Texas criminal abortion statutes that made it a crime to procure or attempt 
to have an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the 
mother. Id. at 117-18. 
The Supreme Court held that the state has an important and legitimate interest in 
preserving and protecting both the health of the pregnant woman and the potentiality of 
human life as embodied by the fetus. Id. at 162. These interests are separate and dis-
tinct; and each interest grows in importance as the woman approaches term and at some 
point during pregnancy becomes "~ompelling." Id. at 162-63. The state's interest in the 
health of the mother becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester. 
Id. at 163. "This is so because of the now-established medical fact ... that until the 
end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal 
childbirth." Id. The interest in potential life becomes compelling at viability, which oc-
curs generally after 26 weeks. Id. at 160, 163. "This is so because the fetus then presuma-
bly has the capacity of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. at 163. 
Consequently, prior to the end of the first trimester a pregnant woman and her phy-
sician are entitled to determine whether the pregnancy should be terminated, and the 
decision will be free of any interference by the state. Id. at 163. Subsequent to the first 
trimester, the state may regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably 
related to the preservation of the mother's health. Id. at 163-64. After viability, however, 
a state may regulate or prohibit an abortion, except where the mother's life or health is 
at stake, in order to further the state's interest in potential life. Id. 
65. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056-57. State-employed health care professionals and 
facilities challenged a Missouri statute that specified that a physician, prior to perform-
ing an abortion on any woman whom he or she has reason to believe is 20 or more weeks 
pregnant, must ascertain whether the fetus is "viable" by performing such medical ex-
aminations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the fetus' gestational age, 
13
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fetus (i.e. "potential life") starts at the point of conception, then 
arguably the state could also claim an interest in the "life" of 
the embryo. A state could argue that the embryo is "potential 
life." 
The Supreme Court holds that each state can bestow some 
legal cognizance on the fetus according to the individual state's 
interest in potential life.88 However, the law still seems to hold 
that the fetus, for now, represents only the potentiality of life.87 
As such, a preimplanted embryo would have no greater right or 
status than that of a fetus. Therefore, under prevailing law it is, 
if anything at all, at most "potential life." However, as of now, 
no legislation or case law has regarded the embryo as either 
human life or "potential life." 
Despite the considerable controversy surrounding legal reg-
ulation of human reproduction, only one reported case has ad-
dressed the specific issue of the legal status that should be ac-
corded to a frozen embryo. The Tennessee case Davis v. Davis88 
involved the disposition of a divorcing couple's seven frozen em-
bryos. Prior to divorce, the infertile couple attempted to have a 
child by IVF. Nine of Mrs. Davis' eggs were fertilized by Mr. 
Davis' sperm.89 Two of the fertilized eggs were implanted in 
Mrs. Davis' womb70 and the remaining seven embryos, which be-
came the subject of the litigation, were preserved cryogenically.71 
weight, and lung maturity. [d. at 3054-58. The Supreme Court held that this section of 
the statute regulating the performance of abortions was constitutional since it permissi-
bly furthered the state's interest in protecting potential human life. [d. 
Despite the uncontradicted medical evidence that established that a 20-week fetus is 
not viable, and that 23 '/2 to 24 weeks' gestation is the earliest point at which a reasona-
ble possibility of viability exists, the Court held that since there may be a four week 
error in estima.ting gestational age, testing for viability at 20 weeks would "permissibly" 
further the state's interest in potential life. [d. at 3055-56. 
Without specifically overturning Roe, the Court undermines the reasoning and prec-
edential strength of Roe by stating in strong dicta that there is no reason why the state's 
compelling interest in protecting potential human life should not exist throughout preg-
nancy rather than coming into existence only at the point of viability. [d. at 3056-57. 
Therefore, a state can arguably implement severe restrictions on the right to procure an 
abortion, prior to viability, based on the state's compelling interest in potential life. 
66. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
67. [d. 
68. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2097 (Blount County Cir. Ct., Tenn., Sept. 26, 
1989). 
69. [d. at 2098. 
70. [d. Implantation of the two embryos did not result in pregnancy. [d. 
71. Id. 
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Subsequently, the couple decided to divorce. As to the fro-
zen embryos, Mrs. Davis wished to implant them and Mr. Davis 
wished them destroyed.72 The trial judge held that embryos are 
not property, but human life,73 and that the doctrine of parens 
patriae controls in matters concerning the "in vitro children. "74 
The "best interests of the children, in vitro," requires that they 
be made available for implantation in a woman to give them the 
opportunity to be born.711 Accordingly, the trial judge awarded 
custody of the frozen embryos to Mrs. Davis for the purpose of 
giving them the chance for live birth.76 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals, without deter-
mining the legal status of the embryo, overturned the ruling of 
the trial judge and granted the parties "joint custody over the 
fertilized ova and ... equal voice over their disposition."77 Since 
the trial court ruling, each party had married other spouses and 
neither wanted to implant the embryos. Mrs. Davis, however, 
wanted to have the embryos donated to another infertile 
couple.7s But Mr. Davis preferred to have custody himself rather 
than donate the frozen embryos to a third party.79 The Tennes-
see Court of Appeals held that the couple should "share an in-
terest in the seven fertilized ova. "80 
In reaching its conclusion, the Davis appeals court looked to 
existing Tennessee law regarding the treatment of fetuses in the 
womb and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
72. [d. at 2104. The Davises had made no prior agreements regarding the disposition 
of any remaining frozen embryos should they no longer desire to use the embryos. [d. at 
2099. . 
73. [d. at 2103. After hearing conflicting expert testimony, the trial judge concluded 
that "the cells of human embryos are comprised of differentiated cells, unique in charac-
ter and specialized to the highest degree of distinction." [d. at 2102. 
74. [d. at 2103. "The doctrine of parens patriae is most commonly expressed as the 
'best interests of the child doctrine' and its sole objective is to achieve justice for the 
child." [d. at 2104. 
75. [d. The trial judge rationalized that to aHow the frozen embryos to remain fro-
zen for more than two years "is tantamount to the destruction of these human beings." 
[d. Unless the embryos are implanted, "their lives will be lost; they will die a passive 
death." [d. 
76. [d. 
77. 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 [hereinafter Davis). 
78. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 at 1. 
79. Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 36. 
80. Davis, 1990 Tenn.' App. LEXIS 642 at 9. 
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concerning the constitutional right to beget a child.81 Under 
Tennessee law, viable fetuses in the womb are not given the 
same protection as persons.82 Even after viability, the fetus is 
not granted the same legal status as that of a born person.83 Fur-
thermore, a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the Ten-
nessee Wrongful Death Statute.84 Accordingly, if an embryo 
were to be considered human life, the embryo would be entitled 
to more legal protection than a more developed fetus is entitled 
to under Tennessee law and this conclusion is inconsistent with 
the policy decisions behind that state's fetal laws. 
Although the Davis appeals court avoided answering the 
question of whether embryos are human life, this single instance 
of judicial consideration of the issues presented by frozen em-
bryos suggests that embryos are not likely to be legally recog-
nized as human life. The Davis case is consistent with the policy 
choice of treating embryos as property and women as life so that 
the interests of the actual living persons are promoted. 811 Hence, 
embryos would be considered property, allowing women to be 
considered life. Women would not be treated as property for the 
sake of the potential life. Davis, however, illustrates the danger 
of leaving this area without legislation. 
B. ApPLICATION OF EXISTING CUSTODY LAWS 
Assuming the existence of legislation protecting the embryo 
over the woman, existing custody laws for minor children could 
then conceivably apply to frozen embryos. 
81. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an individual has a con-
stitutional right to bear or beget a child. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 U.S. 479 (1965). Consequently, the Davis appeals 
court held that "it would be repugnant and offensive to constitutional principles to order 
[Mrs. Davis] to implant these fertilized ova against her will." Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 642, at 8-9. The Davis appeals court further stated that "[i]t would be equally 
repugnant to order [Mr. Davis] to bear the psychological, if not the legal, consequences 
of paternity against his will." Id. at 9. Therefore, unless the couple agreed on the use, the 
embryos would remain frozen indefinitely. See Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen 
Seven, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 36. 
82. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEX IS 642 at 7. 
83. Id. at 8. Furthermore, Tennessee's murder and assault statutes provide that al-
though an attack or homicide of a viable fetus may be a crime, abortion is not. Id. 
84. Id. at 7. 
85. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
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1. What Is In The Best Interest Of The Embryo? 
The fundamental principle in custody disputes is what is 
"in the best interest of the child." Here, the standard would be 
what is "in the best interest" of the embryo, or the child-to-be. 
The best interest standard might require implantation of the 
embryo as soon as possible, since this would give the embryo the 
best chance for live birth. Such a proposition, however, may re-
sult in choosing the interests of the embryo (i.e, the potential 
life) over those of the egg and sperm donors, that is, the actual 
living persons. 
2. Persons To Whom Custody Can Be Awarded 
California custody laws provide that custody of minor chil-
dren should first be awarded to either or both parents, based on 
what the court deems to be "in the best interest of the child."86 
Under California law, in an action between parents regarding 
custody of their minor children, each is equally entitled to cus-
tody.87 After the parents, custody should go to the person or per-
sons with whom the child has been living in a "wholesome and 
stable" environment.88 Last, the award should go to any person 
or persons that the court determines will be suitable and capable 
of providing adequate and proper care to and guidance for the 
child.89 
The above scheme of custodial preference to frozen embryos 
suggests that custody should first be awarded to either biological 
parent, if the court determined such decision to be "in the best 
interest" of the embryo. If the clinic where the embryo is kept, 
while awaiting adoption by another infertile couple, could be 
viewed as a "wholesome" temporary home, then arguably cus-
tody could be awarded to the clinic. Custody might also be 
awarded to another infertile couple who could provide adequate 
and proper care to the embryo. However, an award of custody to 
someone other than the biological parents would result in sacri-
ficing the interests of the biological parents for those of the po-
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
87. See, e.g., Kemmer v. Kemmer, 142 Cal. App. 2d 233, 298 P.2d 26 (1956). 
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(3) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
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tential life. 
In the case of minor children, before a court may award cus-
tody to a person or persons other than a parent, without the 
consent of the parents, it must find that an award of custody to 
a parent would be detrimental to the child.90 Analogously, in the 
case of frozen embryos, the court could feasibly decide that it 
may be "in the best interest" of the embryo not to award cus-
tody to the biological parents, as for instance where the likeli-
hood of implantation of the embryo by the couple is minimal. In 
such a situation, the court could grant custody to a third party. 
Again, the decision would result in sacrificing the interests of the 
biological parents for those of the potential life. 
Under existing custody laws, the principal consideration in 
determining the custody of Ii minor child is the welfare and 
"best interest of the child,"91 or in this case, the frozen embryo. 
Custody laws provide that if the child is of sufficient age and 
capacity to make an intelligent preference, the court must con-
sider that preference in determining to whom custody of the 
child should be awarded.92 The feelings and desires of the par-
ents should be considered only insofar as they affect the "best 
interest of the child."93 The financial condition, interests, 
morals, and dispositions of each parent are factors to be consid-
ered by the court.94 Other factors include the age and tempera-
ment of the child as well as his or her love for either or both 
parents.911 No finding of unfitness is necessary for the court to 
award custody to one parent over the other in accordance with 
what in its sound discretion it determines is "in the best interest 
of the child. "96 
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
91. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pollard, 97 Cal. App. 3d 535, 158 Cal. Rptr. (1979); 
In re Marriage of Coleman, 26 Cal. App. 3d 56, 102 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1972); Gobar v. 
Gobar, 175 Cal. App. 2d 129, 345 P.2d 480 (1959). 
92. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
93. See, e.g., In re Miller, 179 Cal. App. 2d 12, 3 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1960); Taber v. 
Taber, 209 Cal. 755, 290 P. 36 (1930). 
94. See, e.g., Mathewson v. Mathewson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 532, 24 Cal. Rptr. 466 
(1962). 
95. See, e.g., Rude v. Rude, 148 Cal. App. 2d 793, 307 P.2d 679 (1957). 
96. See, e.g., Adleson v. Adleson, 160 Cal. App. 2d 1,324 P.2d 674 (1958); Ducharme 
v. Ducharme, 152 Cal. App. 2d 189, 313 P.2d 33 (1957). 
On the other hand, if the court determines that a parent is not a fit custodian, and if 
there is evidence supporting that finding, the child should not be left in that parent's 
18
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Many of these considerations, such as the child's preference, 
age, temperament, and love of either parent, become inapplica-
ble when determining custody of a frozen embryo because the 
embryo is not yet capable of having the feelings that human be-
ings experience. However, the financial condition, interest, 
morals, and dispositions of each parent, as well as their feelings 
and desires, would still be relevant considerations since these 
factors could indicate the kind of environment each parent can 
provide for the child-to-be. On the other hand, in determining 
the best interest of the embryo, the court may encounter new 
considerations, such as the lapse of time until implantation of 
the embryo, the likelihood of success of implantation, and the 
ability of an interested woman to carry the embryo to term. 
In applying these factors to frozen embryos, the courts 
would face one of two basic choices: award custody of the em-
bryo to the ex-wife if she wishes to implant the embryo, or 
award custody to the ex-husband if the husband desires to have 
the embryo implanted in another woman (such as his new wife 
or a surrogate mother). A court would then have to determine 
which situation would be "in the best interest" of the embryo. 
Since existing custody laws provide that custody should be 
awarded in the first instance to either parent, the partner wish-
ing to procreate might be awarded custody, and thus be permit-
ted. to implant the embryo, even though the other partner may 
wish to avoid having biological offspring.97 
A repercussion of existing laws might be that if the wife did 
not want to implant the embryo, then the husband who desired 
to implant the embryo in a third party could get custody. Con-
versely, if the husband did not want to implant the embryo in a 
third party, then the wife who desired to implant the embryo 
custody. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wellman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 992, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148 
(1980) (in finding that a person is an unfit parent, the court is obligated to consider all 
the evidence bearing upon that question); Stack v. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d 357, 11 'cal. 
Rptr. 177 (1961) (finding no support for lack of fitness of the mother); Clarke v. Clarke, 
35 Cal. 2d 259, 217 P.2d 401 (1950) (considering the personal behavior and characteris-
tics of the parent). 
The requirement of fitness for being awarded custody of a minor child involves more 
than affection and ability to feed, clothe, and house the child properly; it also necessi-
tates an environment that will not be detrimental to the child's character and morals. 
See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 173 Cal. App. 2d 469, 343 P.2d 391 (1959); Reynolds v. Reyn-
olds, 149 Cal. App. 2d 409, 308 P.2d 921 (1957). 
97. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 981. 
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could get custody. In these situations, the interests of one part-
ner are sacrificed for those of the other partner and of the po-
tential life. This notion is inconsistent with the policy choice of 
treating the potential life as property so that the interests of ac-
tual living persons can be promoted. 
If neither biological parent was interested in having the em-
bryo implanted, the courts could consider a third alternative: 
award custody to an infertile couple other than the biological 
parents. If the court was to find that the best interest of the 
embryo would require that it be given the opportunity for life, 
then implantation of the embryo as soon as possible would be 
"in the best interest" of the embryo. This view, however, would 
mean sacrificing the rights of the biological parents (i.e., the ac-
tual living persons) in order to promote the interests of the po-
tential life. 
3. Duties Of The Custodian To The Embryo 
In general, parents are under an obligation to support their 
minor children.98 If these principles of law are applied to frozen 
embryos, crucial and unprecedented issues arise regarding custo-
dial obligations to the frozen embryo. Since the embryo is 
outside the body, it cannot be forcibly placed in the woman who 
provided the egg, because if a woman may remove an implanted 
embryo by abortion, it would follow that she could refuse trans-
fer of the embryo to her womb.99 However, if the ex-wife has 
custody and she changes her mind about implantation or be-
comes incapable of carrying an embryo to term, then a repercus-
sion of existing laws might be that the ex-wife must have the 
embryo implanted in a third party. Similarly, an ex-husband 
98. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 174 Cal. 336, 163 P. 42 (1917). The obligation of a 
parent to support his or her child is an absolute one. See, e.g., Department of Mental 
Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329 P.2d 689 (1958). The parent who is entitled to 
the custody of a child is required by law to give the child support and education suitable 
to the circumstances. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering Supp. 1991). Where the finan-
cial ability of the parents is not an issue, the child is entitled to the common necessaries 
of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical attention. See, e.g., 
Simoneau v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 159 Cal. 494, 115 P. 320 (1911) (father required to supply 
proper medical attention to his crippled children). A parent's duty continues regardless 
of whether the parent is subsequently deprived of custody by judicial decree. See, e.g., 
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1976). 
99. New Reproduction, supra note 2, at 979 (interference of right to procreate). 
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with custody of the frozen embryo could also have an obligation 
to see that the embryo is implanted. However, such an obliga-
tion would mean that the interests of the biological parent 
would be sacrificed for those of the potential life. This would be 
inconsistent with the policy choice of treating the embryo as 
property and the actual living person as life. 
Current custody laws provide that the parent's obligation to 
support his or her child terminates: (1) when the child attains 
majority;IOO (2) upon the minor child's emancipation through 
lawful marriage;IOI or (3) upon death of the parent. I02 On their 
face these laws suggest that the biological parents have an obli-
gation to support the embryo until the embryo becomes a child 
of majority, unless the child marries while a minor or the parent 
dies. An immediate repercussion of existing law here might be 
that if one partner wishes to procreate and the other partner 
wishes to avoid biological offspring, the unwilling partner would 
be obligated to support the embryo during pregnancy and while 
it is a minor child. For instance, the obligations of the biological 
parents of the frozen embryo seem unchanged if one or both of 
the biological parents remarry. This result is also inconsistent 
with the policy choice of treating the embryo as property so that 
the interests of the actual living persons can be promoted. 
III. PROPERTY ANALYSIS 
A. WHETHER THERE ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS To FROZEN 
EMBRYOS 
Under Roe, an embryo is not potential life let alone a full-
fledged life. lo3 Arguably, then, an embryo could be considered 
100. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 245 Cal. App. 2d 341, 53 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966) (gener-
ally the obligation of the parent to provide support for the child terminates when the 
child attains majority, but where an adult child is incapable of self support the duty may 
continue or arise); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 95 Cal. App. 2d 605, 213 P.2d 748 (1950) (father's 
duty to support terminated when children became of age). 
101. See, e.g., Kamper v. Waldon, 17 Cal. 2d 718, 112 P.2d 1 (1941) (relief from 
father's legal duty to support daughter upon daughter's marriage was not recognized 
where agreement had been made to the contrary). 
102. However, when the parent dies leaving the minor child chargeable to the 
county or in a state institution, the estate of the parent is liable to the county or state for 
its support. CAL. ClV. CODE § 205 (Deering 1990). 
103. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. 
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property. However, no case or legislative act has as yet declared 
that a frozen embryo is "property." But one reported case, York 
v. Jones,104 has addressed whether a frozen embryo can be sub-
ject to the rules of property rights. 
In York, a husband and wife brought an action against a 
reproduction facility to obtain possession of the couple's frozen 
embryo. The Yorks were unable to achieve pregnancy through 
normal coital reproduction. 1011 They joined the IVF program at 
Jones Institute in Virginia/06 whereupon six of Mrs. York's eggs 
were fertilized with Mr. York's sperm.107 Five of the resulting 
embryos were transferred to Mrs. York's uterus and the remain-
ing embryo, which was the subject of the litigation, was cryogen-
ically preserved. lOS 
The Yorks moved to California and decided to have their 
frozen embryo implanted in a California clinic. l09 The couple, 
therefore, needed to transfer their embryo from the institute in 
Virginia to the clinic in California. llo The Virginia facility, how-
ever, refused to consent to an interinstitutional transfer of the 
frozen embryo.1l1 The Yorks instituted an action against the 
institute. In denying the institute's motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, the United States District Court held that the 
Yorks had a valid property interest in the frozen embryo under 
a breach of contract cause of action and a detinue claim.1l2 
The York court based the breach of contract claim on a 
bailor-bailee relationship created by the Cryopreservation 
Agreement between the Yorks and the Jones Institute. 1l3 The 
104. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.Va. 1989). 
105. Id. at 423. 
106. Id 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. The issues, however, were never decided by the court as the case was settled. 
Plaintiffs accepted defendant's offer to return the embryo and pay damages. Andrews, 
Birth of a Motion, STUDENT LAW., April 1990, at 30. Because this action involves a mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. York, 717 F. 
Supp. at 423. 
113. York, 717 F. Supp. at 425. 
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York court found that the requisite elements of a bailment were 
present.1I4 In finding that a bailment could have been created, 
the York court acknowledged that the embryo was the "prop-
erty" of the Y orks.lUI Furthermore, in holding that a cause of 
action in detinue was properly alleged, the York court again ad-
vanced the idea that embryos are property.1I6 The decision in 
York is consistent with the policy choice of treating embryos as 
property so that actual living persons, i.e., women, can be 
treated as life.ll7 
The analysis of whether frozen embryos can constitute 
"property" involves an examination of what "property" is. 
"Property" is a generic term1I8 and includes that which is sub-
ject to ownership by one to the exclusion of others.1I9 Property 
can be used to designate the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, 
and dispose of a thing.120 It may also refer to a thing of which 
there may be ownership.121 "Property" is a term with very broad 
meaning and, when used without qualification, may reasonably 
be interpreted to include obligations, rights, and other in-
114. [d. A bailment relationship requires "the element of lawful possession however 
created, and duty to account for the thing as the property of another that creates the 
bailment." [d. The York court found that the "property" element of the bailment rela-
tionship was fulfilled by the reference to the embryo as the "property" of the Yorks in 
the Cryopreservation Agreement. [d. 
115. [d. at 425-27. Furthermore, the Cryopreservation Agreement provided that 
upon divorce, the legal ownership of the embryo "must be determined in a property 
settlement." [d. at 426. 
116. Th!l requisite elements of a detinue action in Virginia are as 
follows: (1) plaintiff must have a property interest in the thing 
sought to be recovered; (2) the right to immediate possession; 
(3) the property is capable of identification; (4) the property 
must be of some value; and (5) defendant must have had pos-
session at some time prior to the institution of the act. 
[d. at 427. 
117. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
118. See, e.g., Bady v. Detwiler, 127 Cal. App. 2d 325, 273 P.2d 941 (1954); Pon-
sonby v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co., 210 Cal. 229, 291 P. 167 (1930) (the 
meaning of the term must be determined by ascertaining the sense in which it was used). 
119. See, e.g., Adrian v. Guyette, 14 Cal. App. 2d 493, 58 P.2d 988 (1936). 
120. See, e.g., McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137 (1858); Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 
110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935) (in its strict legal sense, property represents the indefinite right 
of use, control, and disposition that one may lawfully exercise over particular things or 
objects). 
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (Deering 1990); Bady v. Detwiler, 127 Cal. App. 2d 321, 
273 P.2d 941 (1954). See, e.g., Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935) 
(property is frequently used to signify or describe the subject of property, such as chattel 
or a tract of land). 
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tangibles, as well as physical things. 122 
But the meaning given to the word depends on the context 
in which it is used and the nature of things it is intended to 
include.123 Hence, the definition of "property" may be restricted 
by the particular statute or writing in which it is used.124 Ac-
cordingly, without qualification, frozen embryos could conceiva-
bly fall within the broad definition of "property." 
Assuming that embryos could be considered property and 
that the existing property laws could apply to frozen embryos, 
the next issue is what type of property are embryos. The Califor-
nia Civil Code has divided property into two categories: real or 
immovable property; and personal or movable property. m Real 
property consists of land, anything affixed, incidental, or appur-
tenant to land, and anything immovable by law.126 Personal 
property encompasses any kind of property that does not fall 
within the statutory definition of real property.127 Frozen em-
122. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 96 F. Supp. 318 (S. D. Cal. 1951), aff'd ,195 
F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952). 
123. See, e.g., Bogan v. Wiley, 90 Cal. App. 2d 288, 202 P.2d 824 (1949); Franklin v. 
Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945); Los Angeles Pacific Co. v. Hubbard, 
17 Cal. App. 646, 121 P. 306 (1911). 
124. See, e.g., Bogan v. Wiley, 90 Cal. App. 2d 288, 202 P.2d 824 (1949) (a chose in 
action was not included within the meaning of the property of the decedent as used in 
the probate code); Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945) (The 
word property as used in the code sections relating to community property do not en-
compass every property right acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage, 
other than by gift, bequest, devise or descent. The right to practice medicine and similar 
professions, for instance, is a property right but is not one which could be classed as 
community property.); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Independent Gas Co., 152 Cal. 
765, 93 P. 1006 (1908) (a license tax on an occupation or business is not a tax on prop-
erty although by constitutional or statutory definition franchises are included in the 
meaning of property); People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46 (1854) (overruled on another point 
by People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432 (1868)) ("property," as used by the constitution in 
connection with equal and uniform taxation of all property, does not include a profession 
or occupation). 
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 657 (Deering 1990). 
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 658 (Deering 1990). Furthermore, CAL. CIV. CODE § 14 (Deer-
ing 1990) states that "[t)he words 'real property' are coextensive with lands, tenements, 
and hereditaments." 
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 663 (Deering 1990). In the ordinary and popular sense, per-
sonal property includes only goods and chattels. See, e.g., Estate of Dodge, 6 Cal. 3d 311, 
9491 P.2d 385, 98 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1971); Marin Estate, 69 Cal. App. 2d 147, 158 P.2d 412 
(1945). However, property is not always tangible. CAL. CIV. CODE § 655 (Deering 1990). 
See also John M. C. Marble Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 15 Cal. App. 347, 115 P. 59 
(1911) (an interest in a contract is personal property). Personal property also includes 
inanimate things such as evidences of debt and things in action. CAL. CIY. CODE § 14 
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bryos do not constitute land or anything that is affixed, inciden-
tal, or appurtenant to land. Accordingly, if frozen embryos were 
to be considered "property," then they could possibly be classi-
fied as personal, movable property. 
The California Civil Code enumerates five modes by which 
property may be acquired. 128 The five modes are occupancy,129 
accession!30 transfer, 131 will, and succession. Accession to per-
sonal property occurs when things belonging to different owners 
have been joined to create a single thing that cannot be sepa-
rated without injury.132 The sperm and the egg belong to differ-
ent owners. Hence, the modes of acquiring property further sup-
port the argument that frozen embryos, the result of the union 
of egg and sperm, should be treated as personal property. 
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING PROPERTY LAWS 
The California Civil Code defines ownership as the right to 
possess and use a thing to the exclusion of others.133 The owner-
ship of property may be either absolute or qualified!34 It is ab-
solute when only one person has dominion over the property and 
may use it or dispose of it in any manner not contrary to law.135 
It is qualified when the property is shared by more than one 
person, when the time of enjoyment is deferred or limited, or 
(Deering 1990). 
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1000 (Deering 1990). Property may be acquired in two ways: 
(1) by operation of law, that is, by descent, which is title whereby on death of an ances-
tor, one acquires the estate by right of representation as the heir at law; and (2) by 
purchase, which includes all other modes of acquisition. See Larrabee v. Tracy, 39 Cal. 
App. 2d 593, 104 P.2d 61 (1940). 
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1006 (Deering 1990). Occupancy as used in this section means 
actual possession as distinguished from constructive possession. See Hart v. Allersons, 26 
Cal. App. 664, 148 P. 236 (1915). See also Hanson v. Stinehoff, 139 Cal. 169, 72 P. 913 
(1914) (acts of possession). 
130. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1013, 1025 (Deering 1990). 
131. "Transfer is an act of the parties, or of the law, by which the title to property is 
conveyed from one living person to another." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1039 (Deering 1990). 
132. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1025 (Deering 1990). 
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (Deering 1990). See, e.g., Lane v. Whitaker, 50 Cal. App. 
2d 327, 123 P.2d 53 (1942). 
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 678 (Deering 1990). 
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 679 (Deering 1990). See, e.g., Directors of Fallbrook Irr. Dist. 
v. Abila, 106 Cal. 355, 39 P. 794 (1895) ("owner" in its general and unrestricted meaning, 
when used alone, means one who has full proprietorship in and dominion over property 
and imports an absolute owner). 
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when its use is restricted. 136 Accordingly, ownership in a frozen 
embryo would be qualified since dominion over the embryo 
would arguably be shared by both the sperm provider and the 
egg provider. 
Ownership of property entitles the owner to certain inci-
dents of ownership. Owners have absolute dominion over their 
propertyl37 and may do as they choose with it.lsS Thus, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the egg and sperm providers have deci-
sion-making authority and that they are free to transfer their 
control to others. Arguably, then, the egg and sperm providers 
could do whatever they want with the frozen embryo. As owners, 
it would seem that they could implant,the embryo, give the em-
bryo away, dispose of the embryo, and possibly even sell the em-
bryo. The embryo might also be left frozen indefinitely. 
Although the egg and sperm providers are arguably the 
"owners" of the embryo as against others seeking to exercise 
control, the question remains as to whether there would be lim-
its on their ownership. Proprietary rights are generally limited 
to reasonable uses. IS9 Yet, the state may regulate the acquisition, 
enjoyment, and disposition of property.140 However, in the ab-
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 680 (Deering 1990). 
137. See, e.g., Inyo Consol. Water Co. v. Jess, 161 Cal. 516, 119 P. 934 (1911). 
138. See, e.g., Bree v. Wheeler, 129 Cal. 145, 61 P. 782 (1900). 
Ownership of property carries with it the right to its use, the right to exclude others 
from enjoying it, and the right to its products and accessions. See, e.g., Blaustein v. 
Burton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 161, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970); Story v. Gateway Chevrolet Co., 237 
Cal. App. 2d 705, 47 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1965); Winchester v. Winchester, 175 Cal. 391, 165 
P. 965 (1917)(ordinarily, the owner of property is entitled to the income therefrom). 
Additionally, one may dispose of one's property in any manner not contrary to law. 
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 679 (Deering's 1990). See, e.g., Dana v. Stanford, 10 Cal. 269 (1858); 
Abelein v. Pepper, 8 Cal. 2d 25, 63 P.2d 817 (1936); Bias v. Ohio Farmers Indem. Co., 28 
Cal App. 2d 14, 81 P.2d 1057 (1938). 
Furthermore, one who has the absolute ownership of property is entitled to posses-
sion, unless the right has been transferred. See, e.g., Lantz v. Cole, 172 Cal. 245, 156 P. 
45 (1916); Brown v. Murphy, 36 Cal. App. 2d 171, 97 P.2d 281 (1939)(a person who has 
title and present right of possession may take peaceable possession of what one claims to 
be one's own). 
Finally, ownership of a thing entitles the owner to the use of a reasonable amount of 
force for its protection. See, e.g., Fawkes v. Reynolds, 190 Cal. 204, 211 P. 449 (1922). 
139. See, e.g., Rupp v. Hiveley, 94 Cal. App. 667, 271 P. 768 (1928) (no one has the 
right to interfere with or control the right of the owner of property to use his property as 
he or she sees fit, so long as such use in no way impinges on the property or personal 
rights of another). 
140. See, e.g., Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923). 
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sence of state regulation and as long as the use is reasonable, the 
egg and sperm providers would have unlimited rights of owner-
ship in the frozen embryo. 
However, if they were to transfer those rights, perhaps to 
another infertile couple or to a clinic, then they would no longer 
be the owners and their rights of ownership would cease. Also, 
policies concerning the options of transfer, donation, embryo re-
search, storage, and discard can be made by the individual phy-
sicians, programs, and institutions offering IVF services, thus 
limiting the options actually available to the egg and sperm 
providers. HI 
Finally, possession may exist entirely apart from ownership, 
and one may own a thing not in the owner's possession.H2 One 
in possession of property, however, has rights superior to those 
who have no better title. 143 Thus, if the egg and sperm providers 
grant possessory rights to a clinic, the clinic generally could not 
have rights superior to those of the egg and sperm providers. 
The clinic could have limited rights of possession. 
C. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
Still assuming that embryos are property, the analysis in a 
divorce situation would involve determining each spouse's right, 
if any, to this particular type of property. In a marriage dissolu-
tion proceeding, there are two steps in the process of division of 
property: determining the property subject to division and mak-
ing the division itself.l44 The property subject to division is re-
ferred to as marital property or the marital estate. Therefore, 
embryos would have to be characterized as marital property and 
capable of distribution, in order to qualify as property in a 
divorce. 
141. See New Reproduction, supra note 2, text accompanying notes 329·38. 
142. See, e.g., People v. McKinney, 9 Cal. App. 2d 523, 50 P.2d 827 (1935). 
143. See, e.g., King v. Gotz, 70 Cal. 236, 11 P. 656 (1886); Kimball v. Lohmas, 31 
Cal. 154 (1866). 
144. McKnight, Defining Property Subject to Division at Divorce, 23 FAM. L. Q. 193 
(1989). 
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1. Characterization as marital property 
The property that constitutes the marital estate of spouses 
upon divorce may vary significantly from state to state depend-
ing on how the law of a particular state defines the marital es-
tate. 14li California is one of several community property states.146 
The property to be included in the marital estate of community 
property states is the community property and the "quasi-com-
munity property"l47 of the parties.148 Property excluded from 
the marital estate is called separate property.149 In California, 
145. Id. at 194. 
146. The other community property states are Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mex-
ico and Texas. Washington is a community property state, but by statute Washington 
allows all property to be considered in a division upon divorce. Nevada is a community 
property state, but Nevada allows a portion of one spouse's separate property to be set 
aside for the other spouse's support. Thus, Nevada is a hybrid state. Wisconsin is a com-
munity property state, but Wisconsin applies only to ownership during marriage and 
distribution upon the death of a spouse, not dissolution of marriage. Thus, Wisconsin is 
a hybrid state. 
147. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (Deering 1984) provides: 
"Quasi-community property" means all real or personal prop-
erty, wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired in 
any of the following ways: 
(a) By either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which 
would have been community property if the spouse who ac-
quired the property had been domiciled in this state at the 
time of its acquistion. (b) In exchange for real or personal 
property, wherever situated, which would have been commu-
nity property if the spouse who acquired the property so ex-
changed had been domiciled in this state at the time of its 
acquisition. 
148. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (Deering Supp. 1990). 
149. See, e.g., McCall v. McCall, 2 Cal. App. 2d 92, 37 P.2d 496 (1934). The term 
"separate property" means an estate held, both in its use and in its title, for the exclu-
sive benefit either of the husband or the wife. See, e.g., Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 
(1877 ); George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860). As used here, that term is applicable only 
during the existence of the marriage relation. See, e.g., In re Spencer, 82 Cal. 110, 23 P. 
37 (1889), later proceeding 83 Cal. 460, 23 P. 395 (1890). 
The separate property of the husband or the wife includes: (1) property owned by 
either before marriage; (2) property acquired by either during marriage by gift or by 
bequest, devise, or descent; (3) the rents, issues, and profits of separate property; (4) the 
natural increase of separate property; (5) property purchased with the proceeds of sepa-
rate property; (6) the earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children 
living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the 
other spouse; (7) the earnings or accumulations of either the husband or wife after the 
rendition of a judgment decreeing their legal separation; and (8) all money or other prop-
erty paid by or on behalf of a married person to his spouse in satisfaction of a judgment 
for damages for personal injuries to the spouse or pursuant to an agreement for the 
settlement or compromise of a claim for such damages. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108, 
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the property rights of the husband and the wife are governed by 
relevant provisions of the California Civil Code, unless there is a 
marriage settlement agreement containing stipulations to the 
contrary. 1110 
In California, community property is defined as "property 
acquired by husband and wife, or either, during marriage, when 
not acquired as the separate property of either."Ilii However, the 
term "property," as used in the code sections regarding commu-
nity property, does not include all property rights acquired by 
either husband or wife during marriage, other than that ac-
quired as separate property.Ili2 Community property must have 
certain qualitites such as being susceptible of ownership in com-
mon or transfer and survival. Ili3 Under existing law, frozen em-
bryos could arguably constitute community property if acquired 
during the marriage and if susceptible of ownership in common 
or transfer and survival. 
As a general rule, the character of property as separate or 
community is determined at the time it is acquired. Iii' This char-
acter continues until it is changed in some manner recognized by 
law, such as by agreement. IIiIi It would follow that arguably the 
characterization of frozen embryo~ could be determined by 
5110, 5110.150, 5118, 5119, 5126 (Deering 1984 & Supp. 1991). 
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5200 (Deering Supp. 1991). 
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (Deering 1990). CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (Deering Supp. 
1990) generally provides that except for property owned by either a husband or a wife 
before marriage and property acquired by either during marriage by gift or by bequest, 
devise, or descent, together with the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and except for 
personal injury damages paid by a married person to his spouse, all real property situ-
ated in this state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during marriage 
by a married person while domiciled in this state, is community property including that 
held in trust pursuant to statute. 
152. See, e.g., Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945). 
153. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974) 
(the value of a law practice at the time of dissolution of the community is community 
property); In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973 ) (the 
goodwill of a husband's medical practice is community property); Franklin v. Franklin, 
67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945) (the right to practice medicine and similar 
professions is a property right, but it is not one which could be classed as community 
property). 
154. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 
(1972); See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966); Calloway v. 
Downie, 195 Cal. App. 2d 348, 15 Cal. Rptr, 747 (1961). 
155. See, e.g., Belmont v. Belmont, 188 Cal. App. 2d 33, 10 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1961); 
Calloway v. Downie, 195 Cal. App. 2d 348, 15 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1961). 
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agreement between the husband and the wife. 
2. Division of marital property 
Assuming that frozen embryos could constitute community 
property, the existing laws regarding division of marital property 
would then apply. The property to be divided in proceedings for 
dissolution of marriage consists of the community and quasi-
community property of the parties. llis California law provides 
that such a property division must occur except the division 
based upon the parties' written agreement or upon their oral 
stipulation. lli7 Should frozen embryos be characterized as com-
munity property, existing laws suggest that they would be di-
vided upon divorce, unless the husband and wife stipulate or 
agree otherwise. 
In community property states, community property must be 
divided "equally" between divorcing spouses. lliS Where justified 
by economic circumstances, the court may award an asset to one 
party along with any conditions necessary to bring about a sub-
stantially equal division of the property.lli9 However, the ideal 
division of property is a mathematically equal division. ISO It 
would seem to follow that the frozen embryos would be divided 
equally between the husband and wife. 
However, a court may consider the property as one asset 
consisting of separate parts, and award all of the parts of the 
property to one party. lSI Furthermore, a court can award the 
community property in kind to one party provided that party 
compensates the other party for the other's share of the commu-
nity property.IS2 Thus, existing law suggests that if there is only 
156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (Deering Supp. 1990). 
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
158. Id. In contrast, equitable distribution requires the apportionment of the mari-
tal assets or estate between divorcing parties in an equitable and just manner. The dis-
tribution of property need not be an equal division of the marital assets. This is the law 
in at least forty states. Rostel v. Rostel, 622 P.2d 429 (Alaska 1981). 
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
160. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Juick, 21 Cal. App. 3d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1971); 
Green v. Green, 27 Cal. App. 2d 99, 80 P.2d 513 (1938); Thomsen v. Thomsen, 31 Cal. 
App. 185, 159 P. 1054 (1916). 
161. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Thomsen, 31 Cal. App. 185, 159 P. 1054 (1916). 
162. See, e.g., Lipka v. Lipka, 60 Cal. 2d 472, 386 P.2d 671, 35 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1963) 
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one frozen embryo or an extra frozen embryo because the total is 
an odd number, then the court might decide to award the frozen 
embryo to one party while compensating the other party mone-
tarily for that party's share of the frozen embryo. 
Once a party has been awarded a frozen embryo, that party 
would be the owner of the property and all the existing property 
laws, including the incidents of ownership, would then apply. 
Thus, the other party would no longer have duties, rights, or ob-
ligations to that particular property. The owner would have the 
absolute right of use, enjoyment, and disposition of the frozen 
embryo. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Given the likelihood of legal controversy ansmg from the 
increased use of IVF and embryo freezing procedures, the need 
for legislation at the state level concerning the legal status of the 
frozen embryo has become essential. Clarification of the legal 
status of the embryo is particularly significant, especially to the 
divorcing couple in a marriage dissolution proceeding. The em-
bryo must either be classified as human life and, therefore, be 
subject to a custody suit, or as property whereupon ownership 
will be determined in a property settlement. 
Such a determination involves a policy choice between the 
actual living person and the potential life. If a woman is treated 
as property and the embryo as life, then the woman's interests 
will be sacrificed for those of the potential life. However, by 
treating the embryo as property and the woman as life, the in-
terests of the actual living person would be promoted. Support 
for this position is reflected in the scientific and legal domains. 
Biologically, the embryo is not considered a human life, and cur-
rent case law would deem the embryo to be, at most, potential 
(where the award to the respective parties of varying items of community property cre-
ates an imbalance in equitable division, the use of monetary award from the person re-
ceiving the greater value to the person receiving the smaller value is an acceptable and 
practicable method of adjusting the inequalities in the property values); Pope v. Pope, 
102 Cal. App. 2d 353, 227 P.2d 867 (1951) (a finding that separate and community 
properties have been commingled and consist of money in the bank, real property, trust 
funds, stocks, bonds, and other securities and other personal property, the community 
interest in which exceeds a certain value, is sufficiently definitive to support a money 
award in lieu of an award of specific community property). 
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and not actual life. 
Treatment of the embryo as human life brings into play the 
fundamental principle of the "in the best interest of the child" 
doctrine. This could lead to complications since the embryo 
could conceivably be entitled to more legal protection than is 
accorded a fetus under Roe and Webster. Furthermore, the deci-
sions of one party can impose heavy obligations on the other 
party. Indeed, such obligations placed upon the egg and sperm 
donors may require that the egg and sperm donors sacrifice their 
own rights for those of the embryo. The alternate possibility, 
treating the embryo as property, seems to eliminate many of the 
problems that are inherent if the embryo is viewed as life. 
As mentioned before, there is an urgent need for state legis-
lation as to the legal status to be accorded to the embryo. For all 
the reasons discussed in this article, that status should be one of 
property rather than human life. 
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